

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Clearances for General Accounting
Office Personnel

FROM:

Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

STATINTL

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Executive Officer
to the DD/A

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Legislative Counsel

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Bill Y
Sorry! I
held you up
in my box
g/k

Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800140029-1

19 FEB 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Legislative Counsel

THROUGH : Executive Officer to the DD/A

SUBJECT : Clearances for General Accounting
Office Personnel

REFERENCE : Extracts from Congressional Record
of 11 February 1975 Concerning S.653

1. At the request of the Deputy Director for Administration, the Office of Security has reviewed extracts from the Congressional Record of 11 February 1975 containing Senator Proxmire's comments on his bill to reinstate a General Accounting Office (GAO) audit of Agency funding, the text of a letter to Senator Proxmire from the Acting Comptroller General related to the bill, and the text of the bill itself. This memorandum is meant to provide input with regard to the Comptroller General's letter so that you may include our contributions in a letter being prepared for the Director's signature to the Comptroller General.

2. The 10 May 1974 letter from the Acting Comptroller General to Senator Proxmire suggests that Security is a stumbling block and one of the principal reasons that GAO has not been conducting audits of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other members of the Intelligence Community. While there may be just security policy reasons to limit the number of GAO personnel authorized access to intelligence material, any inference that the mechanics of security clearance processing is a hindrance to the GAO auditing procedures is incorrect. If either with the passage of the proposed legislation of Senator Proxmire or upon an executive determination that GAO personnel should audit Agency activities, the Office of Security is prepared to investigate and adjudicate cases involving GAO personnel for security clearance purposes.


OS 5 0563-A

3. The Acting Comptroller General's letter points out that clearances are expensive and require six or more months to complete. Clearances are expensive and do require time to complete. The Office of Security is prepared to complete the security processing of any GAO staff member within 30 days of receipt of a request for such a clearance accompanied with a completed Personal History Statement.

4. The letter of the Acting Comptroller General also suggests that CIA will not accept security clearances granted by the National Security Agency. This is not totally correct. While Top Secret security approvals in a sense are not transferable, a GAO representative holding such a clearance with NSA or any other member of the Intelligence Community will be granted a Top Secret clearance by CIA prior to any further investigation on our part, if the initial clearance is based on a background investigation by the other agency conducted within five years. This assumes that the investigation was favorable and no disqualifying factors have been identified since the previous investigation.

5. In summary, the Office of Security is prepared to conduct as many investigations as may be required and except for unusual cases of a complicated nature to complete these investigations within 30 days.

6. Depending on the access required on the part of GAO personnel, it may well be necessary to grant such individuals special compartmented access approvals. While the justification in each case for granting such approvals must be examined, it is not expected that this further review would involve more than a few days time.


Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

STATINTL

Our comments outlined above are predicated on the assumption that where need be GAO personnel will meet established staff security criteria, including polygraph examinations.